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Commercial media platforms and the challenges to public expression and 
scrutiny 
 
By Nicholas Carah 
 
Introduction 
 
Media companies are a critical part of the public culture of capitalist liberal democratic 
societies. They balance competing interests as private for-profit organisations expected to 
serve the public interest. For much of the twentieth century the world’s largest media 
companies – including Walt Disney, Comcast, Time Warner and News Corporation  – 
operated a business model that involved investment in creating content. Accordingly, debates 
about the dialectical relationship between their commercial interests and responsibility to the 
public interest focussed mostly on the qualities of the content they produced and social 
discourse they facilitated. The past decade has seen the rise to dominance of Google and 
Facebook as transformative media organisations. The 2016 Top Thirty Global Media Owners 
report ranked Google’s parent company Alphabet as the world’s largest media company with 
annual revenues of US$60 billion (O’Reilly 2016). Facebook, with annual revenues of over 
US$25 billion, is the world’s fifth largest and fastest growing media company (Facebook 
2016a).  
 
Google and Facebook are transformative because they invest in engineering a platform rather 
than producing content (van Dijck 2013). These companies build ‘socio-technical 
infrastructure’ that ‘code social activities into a computational infrastructure’ (van Dijck 
2013: 29). They do not employ writers, editors, journalists, producers, filmmakers or any 
other kind of human content producers. They employ computer engineers, technology 
designers, data analysts, marketers, and social researchers. If we are to understand the 
relationship between media and the public interest in the digital age, we need to develop ways 
of approaching media as much more than technologies of symbolic expression and discursive 
deliberation. Participation on media platforms generates data that is stored and processed by 
the platform, in addition to whatever symbolic content is conveyed from human to human. 
And, that data is used to enhance the capacity of the platform to intervene in public culture: 
shaping the political news we read, predicting the books, music or films we might enjoy, 
determining who will see who in public discussion. Following the terminology of computer 
engineers, we might argue that our engagement with media platforms – searching, streaming 
and expressing our views – trains the platform algorithms to make more finely-tuned 
judgments about our public culture.   
 
In this chapter I argue that media platforms are productively understood as media engineering 
companies (McStay 2013). Corporations like Facebook and Google build platforms that 
structure the expressions, rituals and logistics of public life. To learn what these companies 
might teach us about the changing nature of media, critical communication scholars must pay 
careful attention to their engineering projects, investments in new technologies and public 
announcements about their strategic plans. Their engineering activities illustrate an epochal 
shift in the role commercial media play as the infrastructure of public culture. I contribute to 
critical theories of public interest communication by considering how the engineering 
projects undertaken by media platforms like Google and Facebook challenge how we 
understand the public interest role of media organisations. I fully acknowledge that ‘social 
media’ raise many questions about media and the public interest that relate to the qualities of 
public discourse (Gillespie 2014, Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira 2012, Papacharissi 
2015). For the most part, I sidestep questions about the responsibility of platforms to monitor 
and moderate the qualities of public speech or to provide open access to forums of public 
expression. I also deliberately focus on Google and Facebook because I argue they are the 
two transformative media corporations whose engineering projects are reconstructing what 
media are and how they intervene in public life. Facebook started out as a web-based social 
networking site, and Google as a search platform. Now both are more accurately understood 
as large-scale experiments in developing a historically significant infrastructure for data 
collection, storage and processing. They are making serious investments in artificial 
intelligence, augmented reality and logistics like automated transport and retail. In doing so, 
they are transforming what we understand media to be as institutions, technologies and 
infrastructure that undergird public life.  
 
My aim is to argue for a critical account of media platforms and the public interest that 
follows the strategic investments and directions of the platforms themselves. This strategy of 
critical inquiry draws inspiration from Dallas Smythe (Smythe & Dinh 1983), who implored 
critical communication scholars to take the strategic plans and pronouncements of corporate 
media organisations as a useful record of how they act in the world. Following this impulse, 
we should pay attention to the fundamental process unfolding: the reengineering of media as 
a set of institutions and technologies whose data processing capacity is at the heart of the 
interventions they are, and will, make in public life (Andrejevic 2007, 2013).  
 
My beginning question then is: how can a critical account of public interest communication 
respond to the engineering projects and data processing power of media companies? My 
proposition here is that public interest communication has been almost exclusively concerned 
with communication as symbolic expression. Johnston (2016: 18) illustrates that definitions 
of the public interest relating to media concern disclosing information judged to be of public 
importance because it enables citizens to make informed decisions and hold the powerful to 
account; and, preventing the disclosure of false or misleading information. The public interest 
is framed entirely in terms of the role media play in creating and circulating symbolic 
information.  As Johnston (2016) argues the public interest is historically contingent, and as 
such, I argue that we are undergoing a period where a dramatic change in the role media play 
in public culture needs to be accompanied by a reconsideration of their relation to the public 
interest.  
 
Public culture as an engineering problem 
 
A new kind of public communication is emerging on media platforms that involve the 
interplay between human and machine judgment. Within established frameworks of the 
public interest, the role that media platforms’ algorithmic machinery plays in judging, 
curating, optimising and shaping public expression deserves scrutiny. Present approaches to 
the public interest assume the primary actor to be humans working within institutional 
settings to decide what information will be disclosed to the public. This must be now 
augmented with accounts of the creation of computational machines that make decisions 
about who speaks and who is heard. Platforms tend to view the challenge of conceptualising 
and acting in the public interest as an engineering problem.  
 
In a public relations ‘video chat’ posted to Facebook in December 2016, the Chief Operating 
Officer Sheryl Sandberg and the Chief Executive Officer and Founder Mark Zuckerberg 
discussed key public affairs issues for the platform over the past year (Zuckerberg 2016). The 
chat with Sandberg followed several months of criticism regarding Facebook’s role in 
influencing the 2016 Presidential election (Tufekci 2016). In a brief reference to the public 
debate about Facebook’s role in amplifying the distribution of ‘fake news’ during the US 
Presidential election Zuckerberg explained that  
Facebook is a new kind of platform. It’s not a traditional technology company. You 
know, we build technology and we feel responsible for how it is used. We don’t write 
the news that people read on the platform. But at the same time we also do a lot more 
than just distribute news, and we’re an important part of the public discourse.  
Zuckerberg’s admission that Facebook was more than just a distributor of news was taken by 
some commentators to be an admission that the company did recognise its editorial 
responsibilities (Gibbs 2016). An established view of commercial media and the public 
interest might assume that being ‘an important part of the public discourse’ involves 
institutionalising norms of human editorial judgement. For instance, newsroom studies 
illustrate how the professional values of journalists are embedded in the rules and routines of 
news organisations (Deuze 2005, Tuchman 1978). The culture of a newsroom is a site where 
commercial and public interests are negotiated and balanced. Norms about how reality is 
represented are institutionalised in ethical guidelines, style guides and editorial practices. 
Significantly, all of these processes have been undertaken by humans within media 
organisations throughout the twentieth century.  
 
Facebook’s responses to issues regarding its responsibility to the public interest suggest that 
the platform does not intend to develop a human editorial culture. For instance, Facebook’s 
response to controversy over bias in its ‘trending topics’ news stories was to remove the 
human editorial team allegedly causing the biased results and replace them with a ‘more 
neutral’ algorithm. In a Facebook post, the platform stated ‘making these changes to the 
product allows our team to make fewer individual decisions about topics’ (Facebook 2016b). 
In Facebook’s response to its discovery of 3000 advertisements produced by ‘inauthentic’ 
accounts during the US Presidential election, it announced its plans to ‘apply machine 
learning’ to reduce  these ads in the future (Stamos 2017). The implication here is  that 
decisions made by humans are biased, and the more reliable and publicly responsible editorial 
practice involved engineering a better algorithm. In his chat with Sandberg then, Zuckerberg 
wasn’t signalling a move toward more human editorial judgment at Facebook, but rather 
acknowledging the platform had a new kind of engineering problem. 
 
When Sandberg and Zuckerberg pointed to the key contributions the platform had made to 
public culture over the past year they didn’t talk about content they produced or curated, or 
improvements they had made to processes of editorial judgement. Rather, they showcased 
logistical applications the platform had engineered, such as the Safety Check (Gleit et al. 
2014). The Safety Check appears at the top of the Facebook News Feed of any users who are 
near to a natural disaster or crisis situation like a cyclone, earthquake or terrorist attack. The 
Check asks ‘Are you safe?’ If you click ‘I’m safe’ all your friends are notified via their News 
Feed. Facebook’s public contribution here is infrastructural and logistical. At the intimate 
level the platform provides the infrastructure to tell loved ones you are safe. And, at the 
population level the data collected via the Safety Check has a logistical value. It can be 
provided to public authorities in real time to enable prioritisation of emergency resources.  
 
The Safety Check offers one example of how media platforms like Facebook imagine their 
contribution to public culture and the broader public interest. They see their public value as 
media engineers, rather than facilitators of symbolic expression and public deliberation. By 
media engineering, I mean that the investment Facebook makes is not in the production of 
symbolic content but in the engineering of interfaces, algorithms, databases, and protocols 
that shape the interplay between humans and increasingly calculative media platforms 
(Brodmerkel & Carah 2016; McStay 2013; van Dijck 2013). Of crucial importance, media 
corporations organised around engineering rather than content production view media first 
and foremost as infrastructure for collecting, storing and processing data (Packer 2013). 
Engineers do not focus on developing more compelling symbolic narratives; rather they work 
to expand the sensory capacity of media devices to collect information about lived 
experience, the logistics of storing data, and the computational work of processing that data 
(Andrejevic & Burdon 2015). These engineering activities change the way media intervene in 
public life and in doing so raise new questions about how media exercise power in public life. 
In this framework, media are not so much institutions that narrate public life; they instead 
become infrastructure for intervening in public life.  
 
Media platforms and digital democracy  
 
Thinking about digital media platforms primarily as engineering projects, presses back on 
accounts of the democratic affordances of digital media throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s, which celebrated the emerging participatory culture of message boards, online chat, 
email lists and blogs. A ‘surprisingly diverse array of political interests’ (Dahlberg 2011: 
855) from establishment institutions to radical activists took digital media to be inherently 
democratic because they enabled ordinary people to speak and be heard (Dahlberg 2011, 
Hindman 2008, Turner 2010). During this period, the capacity of ordinary people to create 
and distribute content on digital media seemed especially novel and democratic in contrast to 
the dominant mass media institutions, where the capacity to produce content was 
concentrated in the hands of elite owners and the professional meaning makers they 
employed. The emerging data-processing power of digital media was largely absent from 
these accounts, and even critical accounts mostly focussed on issues such as the digital divide 
between who could and couldn’t access platforms or the emerging commercialisation of 
platforms with targeted advertising. Few accounts focussed on the looming impact platforms’ 
data-processing capacity would have on public speech itself. In the present moment, a 
rigorous account of media platforms and the public interest in the digital era must pay critical 
attention to the engineering culture, data-processing power, and interplay between human and 
machine judgments that now undergirds our everyday public culture. Media institutions like 
Facebook and Google engineer platforms that are powerful non-human actors in public 
communication. 
 
Dahlberg (2011) critically examines four influential discourses through the 1990s and 2000s 
that each articulated how democratic public culture could be extended through digital media 
technologies: liberal-individualist, deliberative, counter-publics, and autonomist Marxist. I 
turn to Dahlberg’s framework here because of its significant historical value in carefully 
elaborating how the democratic potential of digital media was understood by establishment 
and activist political groups throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
In the liberal-individualist account digital media enables individuals to access information to 
make informed choices, express those choices, and for elites to aggregate those choices via 
automated data analysis of public opinion. In this position we see the expression of an 
establishment view about the value of linking participatory public expression with automated 
surveillance and data analysis. Digital media promises to make citizens more visible in terms 
of expression of views in pre-formatted modes: such as completing an online poll, sharing a 
news story, or commenting on a political issue. Each of these actions can be efficiently 
collected, analysed and aggregated by the computational machinery of digital media. In this 
sense, digital media enable the more efficient and organised management of public opinion. 
In the liberal-individualist account digital media enables individuals to access information to 
make informed choices, express those choices, and for elites to aggregate those voices via 
automated data analysis of public opinion. In this position we see the expression of an 
establishment view about the value of linking participatory public expression with automated 
surveillance and data analysis. This discourse is historically interesting, at least in the way 
Dahlberg critically documents it, for the way it emphasises the expressive affordances of 
digital media, but elides the logics of data-processing that are central to ‘aggregating 
preferences’. That is, exponents of this view do not attempt to make an emphatic account of 
surveillance and data-processing as democratic, but rather shift emphasis to capacity for 
public expressions to be made and understood.  
 
The deliberative position conceives digital media as an apparatus for reflexive, reciprocal and 
inclusive rational debate that generates consensus. The counter-public discourse emphasises 
the role digital media play in enabling activist and marginalised groups to form outside of 
dominant discourses. While both emphasise discursive engagement, in the counter-public 
discourse, that deliberation can be agonistic, rather than deliberative, rational and consensus-
building. In these discourses, digital media are celebrated for enabling previously excluded 
voices to give an account of their life and its conditions (Couldry 2010). The deliberative and 
counter-publics views each put the emphasis firmly on symbolic expression as the foundation 
of digital media’s participatory culture and democratic affordances. For the most part, like the 
liberal-individualist position, deliberative and counter-publics discourses also ignore the data 
processing power of digital media although they are more likely than the liberal-individualist 
to critically contend with how the political economy of media shapes public communication.  
 
The autonomist Marxist position ‘sees digital communication networks as enabling a 
radically democratic politics’ that is self-organised, de-centralised, and de-institutionalised 
(Dahlberg 2011: 861). This position goes beyond the norms of capitalist liberal democracy, to 
imagine radically new democratic formations based on a self-organising commons. The 
autonomist position is a radical critique of network capitalism. It is particularly valuable 
because, different to the liberal-individualist, deliberative and counter-publics discourses, 
autonomist Marxists understood the digital as a new mode of production. Digital media were 
always much more than platforms for symbolic expression, they were more primarily 
logistical infrastructure for organising the living capacities of humans to political, economic 
and cultural ends. Autonomists contributed dialectical accounts of how digital media were 
both products of capitalist production at the same time they produced forms of social 
organisation that threatened established power relationships.  
 
These discourses are historically useful because they articulate early, and often utopian, 
visions of the democratic affordances of digital media. If we use the conventions of the 
digital democracy debates of the 1990s and 2000s as a reference point, then media 
institutions like Facebook, Google, Twitter, Instagram and so on seem remarkably different 
to broadcast media because of the presence of ordinary people creating, circulating and 
interacting with media content. It is their large-scale participatory culture that is most often 
the starting point for considerations of their role in public interest communication. With the 
exception of autonomist Marxism, they largely put the emphasis on forms of symbolic 
expression that constituted a new kind of participatory public culture. This was reasonable 
during the 1990s when the possibility of the internet as a public commons still seemed 
possible, if not likely, and the predominant online platforms were organised around symbolic 
expression mostly via written language. While these early views of digital media, at least as 
Dahlberg (2011) presents them, largely omit the data-processing power of media it is possible 
to speculate how these positions could address the data-economy of digital media. In the 
liberal-individualist account data is a useful part of the aggregation of preferences. Whereas, 
in the deliberative, counter-public and autonomist Marxist discourses the use of data to shape 
public communication would become a critical issue. As Dahlberg (2011) notes, the liberal-
individualist position is concerned predominantly with individual rights, while the other 
positions are more inclined to address the systemic features of digital media platforms.  
 
By the mid-2000s, especially with the emergence of major commercial platforms like Google 
and Facebook, strong critiques of the celebratory accounts of ‘digital democracy’ began to 
emerge (Andrejevic 2007;,Dean 2010; Hindman 2008). These critiques addressed a range of 
issues: questions of how access to digital media reflected larger divisions in society; the rapid 
commercialisation of the online commons and the appropriation of participation as free 
labour; the form and quality of online ‘debate’ including its apparent polarisation into 
partisan bubbles and the emergence of snark, cynicism and trolling; and importantly, the 
computational infrastructure of digital media, as a neglected element in early discourses 
about the democratic affordances of the internet. 
 
Critical accounts of the democratic affordances of the internet began to argue that attention 
needed to be given to how participation acts as an alibi for submission to mass surveillance 
(Andrejevic 2007). In these critiques, a demand was made to address the interdependence 
between the participatory and data-processing affordances of digital media. For instance, in 
Dean’s (2010) critique of communicative capitalism, digital media encourage individuals to 
express themselves, and construct that expression as empowering and enjoyable. Yet, they do 
not listen to the qualities of what is expressed. Rather, expression becomes part of a 
continuous flow of symbols and data within the networks of capitalist production. The 
continuous flow of symbols obfuscates the possibility for careful deliberation among humans, 
and the flow of data enhances the capacity of groups that control digital media platforms to 
monitor and shape public life (Andrejevic 2013). In a similar spirit, Clough (2008, p. 16) 
argued that the current moment is characterised by a shift where ‘the function of media as a 
socializing/ideological mechanism has become secondary to its continuous modulation, 
variation and intensification of affective response in real time’. Significant here is the critical 
attention to changes in both the qualities and uses of public discourse. As Mark Andrejevic 
(2012) puts it, the invitation to engage in participatory mediated constructions of the self was 
accompanied by the rise of cynical distance to those representations. At the same time as 
those expressions lost their purchase as meaningful exchanges in a symbolic discussion 
between human participants, they acquired value as data within the commercial models of 
digital media industries. Drawing on this lineage of critical debate, in the following sections I 
consider how participation on digital media doubles as the labour of training the platform 
itself as an increasingly intelligent non-human actor in public life. This is historically 
significant. For all the uses humans have made of media technologies to facilitate public 
expression during the twentieth century, that activity did not directly contribute to enhancing 
the calculative capacities of the medium itself. Public action and expression now addresses 
and trains machines in addition to influencing or persuading other humans (Striphas 2016).  
 
Public communication is participation in training machines 
 
Media platforms have a strategic interest in keeping users engaged with their feeds of content 
more frequently and for longer periods of time. The more user engagement platforms 
generate, the more attention and data is created for sale to advertisers. Platforms’ content 
recommendation algorithms constantly ‘train’ on user data, refining their capacity to predict 
user preferences. Over time, customised feeds of content are ‘filtered’ more precisely to 
match user preferences. For instance, when a user scrolls through their Facebook News Feed 
each time they pause over, like, click or comment on a piece of content they generate data 
about their preferences, and the preferences of people like them. The News Feed gradually 
adapts to serve more content that matches their interests. This logic extends across platforms. 
For example, as we watch and rate films on Netflix, the platform learns what films we like. 
As we browse books on Amazon, it learns what books we like. As we click links and like 
Tweets on Twitter, it learns what political views we hold. I mean ‘learns’ here in terms of the 
capacity of a machine to accurately predict, rather than in the human sense of being able to 
make qualitative judgments about cultural objects based on schemas of taste, genre or 
political ideology. Machines make judgments about culture that achieve the same ends as 
humans, but without using the same means and schemas.  
 
The distinctive change here is not the development of procedures that regulate what ideas are 
created and circulated, but rather the creation of machines that make these judgments 
(Hallinan & Striphas 2016). Developing procedures that efficiently standardise the 
production of sustained audience attention has always been a feature of commercial media 
institutions. The institutional production of news for instance is defined by a bureaucratic 
culture that proceduralises decision-making and content production. Editors and journalists 
repeat a sequence of steps each day to produce a product – a newspaper or television news 
bulletin – that is similar in format. The format encodes knowledge, accumulated over time, 
about what kinds of news bulletins sustain the attention of the audience.  
 
Consider the difference between reading a printed newspaper each morning and scrolling 
through a customised Facebook News Feed. The ordering of the stories in a newspaper is 
undertaken by a human editor. The editor makes judgments shaped by personal, institutional 
and professional factors: their sensibility about what is a good story, their personal values, 
their sense of responsibility to the public interest, the commercial imperatives of the 
institution,  the implicit adoption of news values, and professional norms such as ‘balance’ or 
‘objectivity’. Every reader sees the same newspaper. In contrast, the ordering of stories in a 
Facebook News Feed is undertaken by a non-human algorithm.  The important element here 
is not that a bureaucratic procedure once done by humans is now done by machines, it is 
rather the capacity of the algorithm to learn the preferences of individual readers and 
customise the feed of stories they see. The machine becomes an actor in shaping 
communication because it customises the news that each individual sees. The News Feed’s 
capacity to make these judgments depends on users coding their social life into the 
computational architecture of the platform (van Dijck 2013). When the News Feed was 
introduced in 2006, the algorithmic decision making was relatively simple. For instance, 
engineers programmed the feed to weight images higher than short text updates, based on the 
assumption that all users found images more engaging. Over time however, the feed has been 
engineered to ‘learn’ by ‘training’ on the data generated by users as they interact with the 
platform.  
 
On platforms like Facebook the ordering of public culture is increasingly delegated to 
machines (Hallinan & Striphas 2016). Human forms of public communication train machines 
to organise, curate and optimise their cultural experiences. Gillespie (2017) argues that 
platforms  
don’t make content, but they make important choices about that content: what they 
will distribute to whom, how they will connect users and broker their interactions, and 
what they will refuse… we have to revisit difficult questions about how they structure 
the speech and social activity they host, and what rights and responsibilities should 
accompany that. 
To this critical focus on the non-human decision-making power of platforms, we must also 
bring an understanding of the central role that participation in public life plays by coding 
lived experience into platform databases, enabling those platforms to more efficiently 
scrutinise, experiment with, and optimise their decision-making. Paying attention to how 
platforms ‘structure’ social life means understanding public expression as not something that 
happens ‘after’ the platform architecture is created, but as something that is always 
implicated in the construction of the material platform itself, and its capacity to intervene in 
public life. This is an important point. Think of a comparison between television and a social 
media platform. For all the time that the audiences spent watching television during the 
twentieth century, that activity of watching contributed very little to the material form of the 
medium itself. In the case of a social media platform however, the everyday act of watching 
and being watched continually transforms the platform and its capacity to be a non-human 
actor in public life.  
 
Participation on media platforms, as much as it might constitute freely chosen forms of public 
communication, also always doubles as productive labour. The participatory labour 
characteristic of the digital economy was first theorised by autonomist Marxists as ‘free’ and 
‘immaterial’ labour (Terranova 2000). Terranova (2000) examined the work undertaken by 
moderators in online chat forums of early commercial internet providers. She argued that this 
labour was free in the sense that it is both freely given as part of the conduct of everyday 
public culture, and that it is given for free in the sense that it was unpaid. These accounts 
elaborated how digital media was dependent on the freely given participation of users who 
organised, managed and produced the online networks of which they were a part. Andrejevic 
(2002) described this labour as the ‘work of being watched’. The work of being watched has 
two facets: user-generated content and user-generated data. When users create and upload 
text, images and video to digital media platforms they produce the content that other users 
watch—they do the work of attracting the audience attention of peers that is then sold by 
platforms to advertisers. When users of all kinds interact with platforms they generate data 
that is used to target advertisements, refine platform algorithms, and sold to third parties for 
market analytics. Surveillance of digital media users is not just used to target advertisements, 
it contributes directly to the development of the computational capacities of the platform 
itself. Public communication is now implicated in the generation of the computational 
capacity of media. The data our acts of public communication generate directly informs the 
creation of a media infrastructure more able to exert power over public life (Andrejevic 
2013).  
 
Public communication is participation in experiments 
 
The development and training of an algorithmic media infrastructure depends on continuous 
experimentation with users. Public communication on social media routinely doubles as 
participation in experiments like A/B tests, which are part of the everyday experience of 
using platforms like Google and Facebook (Andrejevic 2013; Christian 2012; Crawford 
2014). These tests, which are invisible to users, work like this: an A/B test involves creating 
alternative versions of a web page, set of search results, or feed of content. Group A is 
diverted to the test version, Group B kept on the current version and their behaviours are 
compared. A/B testing enables the continuous evolution of platform interfaces and 
algorithms. A/B testing is not unusual: Wired reported that in 2011 Google ‘ran more than 
7000 A/B tests on its search algorithm’ (Christian 2012). The results of these tests informed 
the ongoing development of the algorithm’s decision making sequences. Two widely 
publicised experiments – popularly known as the ‘mood’ and ‘voting’ experiments – by 
Facebook illustrate how these A/B tests are woven into public culture, contribute to the 
design of platforms, and raise substantial questions about the impact the data processing 
power of media has on public communication. Each experiment was reported in peer-
reviewed scientific journals and generated extensive public debate (Bond et al. 2012; Jones et 
al. 2017; Kramer et al. 2014). In this section I consider the implications of these experiments 
for how we understand the relationship between media platforms’ data-driven engineering 
and the public interest.  
 
Facebook engineers and researchers published the ‘voting’ experiment in Nature in 2012 
(Bond et al. 2012). The experiment was repeated, with similar results, during the 2012 
Presidential elections (Jones et al. 2017). The experiment was conducted during the 2010 US 
congressional election and involved 61 million Facebook users. The researchers explained 
that on the day of US congressional elections all US Facebook users who accessed the 
platform were randomly assigned to a ‘social message’, ‘informational message’ or ‘control’ 
group. The 60 million users assigned to the social message group were shown a button that 
read ‘I Voted’, together with a link to poll information, counter of how many Facebook users 
had reported voting and photos of friends who had voted. The information group were shown 
the same information, except for photos of friends. The control group were not shown any 
message relating to voting. In total, 6.3 million Facebook users were then matched to public 
voting records, so that their activity on Facebook could be compared to their actual voting 
activity. The researchers found that users ‘who received the social message were 39% more 
likely to vote’ and on this basis estimated that the ‘I Voted’ button ‘increased turnout directly 
by about 60,000 voters and indirectly through social contagion by another 280,000 voters, for 
a total of 340,000 additional votes’ (Bond et al. 2012: 297). 
 
The experiment, and Facebook’s reporting on it, reveals how the platform understands itself 
as infrastructure for engineering public social action: in this case, voting in an election.  Legal 
scholar and critic Jonathan Zittrain (2014) described the experiment as ‘civic-engineering’. 
The ambivalence in this term is important: a positive understanding of civic engineering 
might present it as engineering for the public good because it mobilised democratic activity;  
a negative interpretation might see it as manipulative engineering of civic processes. 
Facebook certainly presented the experiment as a contribution to the democratic processes of 
civic society. They illustrated that their platform could contribute to participation in elections. 
The more profound lesson however, is the power it illustrates digital media may be acquiring 
in shaping the electoral activity of citizens. Data-driven voter mobilisation methods have 
been used by the Obama, Clinton and Trump campaigns in recent Presidential elections 
(Kreiss 2016). These data-driven models draw on a combination of market research, social 
media and public records data. While the creation of data-driven voter mobilisation within 
campaigns might be part of the strategic contest of politics, the Facebook experiment 
generates more profound questions. Zittrain, like many critics, raised questions about 
Facebook’s capacity as an ostensibly politically neutral media institution to covertly 
influence elections. For example, the experiment could be run again, except without choosing 
participants at random; rather Facebook could potentially choose to mobilise some 
participants based on their political affiliations and preferences.  
 To draw a comparison with the journalism of the twentieth century, no media proprietor in 
the past could automatically prevent a specified part of the public from reading information 
they published about an election. In contrast, Facebook’s experiment demonstrates that the 
platform can do just this – exclude information from sectors of the community in order to 
manipulate an outcome.  
 
This appears to be how some political operatives used Facebook during the 2016 US 
Presidential campaign. Facebook announced in September 2017 that they had found 
‘approximately $100,000 in ad spending from June of 2015 to May of 2017 – associated with 
roughly 3000 ads... [that] appeared to focus on amplifying divisive social and political 
messages across the ideological spectrum’ (Stamos 2017). Although Facebook did not release 
specific details, these ads appear to be ‘dark’ posts, or in Facebook’s terminology 
‘unpublished page posts’. These are promoted posts or ads that are only visible to the specific 
users targeted. They are commonly used in digital advertising, including by political 
campaigns, and they ‘pose a serious transparency threat’ to the mechanisms of accountability 
that govern political advertising and other kinds of public speech (Lapowsky 2017). The 
important point is this. The concerns raised about Facebook’s ‘get out the vote’ experiments 
by Zittrain and others seem to be borne out. Kriess and Mcgregor (2017) report that the major 
platforms embed consultants within Democrat and Republican political campaigns. These 
consultants help these campaigns to most effectively use the platform to engage with their 
targeted constituency. They are commercialising their capacity to influence that capacity of 
targeted groups to vote. Political operatives from election campaigns and foreign 
governments, just like advertisers more generally, use the Facebook platform to create ‘dark’ 
posts that are only seen by specific individuals, and not others. From a public interest 
perspective this is problematic because it undermines accountability and scrutiny, it neuters 
the possibility of debate and deliberation, and it corrodes the process through which shared 
understandings of reality are produced.  
 
Facebook’s ‘mood’ experiment was reported in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science in 2014 (Kramer et al. 2014). The mood experiment involved the manipulation of 
user News Feeds similar to the voting experiment. The purpose of this study was to test 
whether ‘emotional states’ could be transferred via the News Feed. The experiment involved 
689,003 Facebook users. To this day, none of these users know they were involved in the 
experiment. The researchers explained that the ‘experiment manipulated the extent to which 
people were exposed to emotional expressions in their News Feed’ (Kramer et al. 2014, p. 
8788). For one week one group of users were shown a News Feed with reduced positive 
emotional content from friends, while another group was shown reduced negative emotional 
content. The researchers reported that ‘when positive expressions were reduced, people 
produced fewer positive posts and more negative posts; when negative expressions were 
reduced, the opposite pattern occurred’ (Kramer et al. 2014, p. 8788). In short, Facebook 
reported that they could, to an admittedly small degree, manipulate the emotions of users by 
tweaking the News Feed algorithm.  
 
Much of the public debate about the mood experiment focussed on the ‘manipulation’ of the 
user experience, the question of informed consent to participate in A/B experiments, and the 
potential harm of manipulating the moods of vulnerable users. These concerns matter. But, as 
was rightly noted by Crawford (2014) and others, focus on this one experiment obscures the 
fact that the manipulation of the user News Feed is a daily occurrence – it is just that this 
experiment was publicly reported. And, these experiments are legal, users consent to being 
routinely involved in these experiments when they sign up to the platform (Crawford 2014). 
More importantly, the voting and mood experiments illustrate how public communication 
doubles as the creation of vast troves of data and participation in experiments with that data. 
In other words, when views are expressed on Facebook they not only persuade other humans, 
they contribute to the compilation of databases and the training of algorithms that can be used 
to shape our future participation in public culture. 
 
The response of critics like Jonathan Zittrain (2014), Kate Crawford (2014) and Joseph 
Turow (2012) to the data-driven experiments described here, highlight some of the new 
public interest concerns the experiments generate. Crawford argues that all users should be 
able to choose to ‘opt in’ and ‘opt out’ of A/B experiments, and see the results of experiments 
they participated in. Zittrain proposes that platforms should be made ‘information 
fiduciaries’, in the way that other professions like doctors and lawyers are. Like Crawford, he 
envisions that this would require users to be notified of how data is used and for what 
purpose, and would proscribe certain uses of data. Turow (2012) proposes that all users have 
access to a dashboard where they can see how data is used to shape their experience, and 
choose to ‘remove’ or ‘correct’ any data in their profile. All these suggestions seem 
technically feasible, but would likely meet stiff resistant from the platforms. They are helpful 
suggestions because they help to articulate an emerging range of public interest 
communication concerns specifically related to public participation in the creation of data, 
and the use of that data to shape public thoughts, feelings and actions. None of these 
proposals though address directly the public interest in a collective sense; rather they are each 
formatted at the level of the individual consumer rights. In doing so, they replicate the values 
of the liberal-individualist discourse outlined by Dahlberg (2011) above.  
 
Where critical public interest research and activism could make a necessary contribution is in 
articulating the collection and experimentation with public communication as data at the level 
of the public. We must address not just the choices offered to individual users, but the 
entanglement of media platforms with communication as a public act and interest and, 
importantly, the transparency with which this process takes place. The bigger question is that, 
as much as the algorithmic infrastructure of media platforms generates pressing questions 
about who speaks and who is heard, they also generate pressing questions about who gets to 
experiment with data and whether the public understands its role in the participatory process. 
Public communication is now a valuable resource used to experiment with public life. Mark 
Andrejevic (2014) describes this as the ‘big data divide’: the power relations of public 
communication now also include who has access to the infrastructure to process public 
culture as data and intervene in it on the basis of those experiments.  
 
Media engineering and the public interest  
 
To conclude, I suggest that there are two options for considering what media platforms as 
engineering projects means for public interest communication.  
 
The first is to retain an ‘established’ account of public interest communication as only 
concerning discursive expression. To the extent that media have a public interest obligation 
this option extends only to the media’s role in shaping public discussion, debate, dialogue and 
information sharing. Working within this public interest framework, critical accounts of 
media platforms would be confined to the role their algorithmic infrastructure plays in 
brokering speech acts.  
 
The second option is to invite a more ‘radical’ reworking of media and the public interest as 
going beyond discursive expression. This would involve reconceptualising media as 
fundamentally engineering enterprises that collect, store and process data. This option sees 
media organisations as engineering increasingly intelligent machines able to intervene in 
reality in a number of ways. If media are understood in this way then public communication 
must be understood as acts that not only address other humans but also address data-
processing machines. Facebook and Google are each investing in augmented reality and 
artificial intelligence as the next generation of their platform architecture (Chafkin 2015; 
Recode 2016). So, as we ‘attach’ media devices to our bodies, in addition to whatever 
symbolic ideas we express, we also produce troves of data that train those machines and we 
make ourselves available as living participants in their ongoing experiments.  
 
A critical account of public interest communication that contends with the engineering 
projects and data processing power of media platforms has, I suggest, three starting points. 
Firstly, the politics of the user interface: How does everyday user engagement with a media 
platform generate data that trains the algorithms which increasingly broker who speaks and 
who is heard? Secondly, the politics of the database: How do media platforms broker which 
institutions and groups get access to the database? If the first concern attends to the perennial 
public interest question of ‘who gets to speak’, then this concern attends to the new public 
interest question of who gets to experiment? Thirdly, the politics of engineering hardware: 
How do we understand public interest communication in an historical moment where the 
capacity of media to intervene in reality goes beyond the symbolic? In particular, what will 
be the public interest questions generated by artificial intelligence and augmented reality? 
These technologies will take the dominant logic of media beyond the symbolic to the 
simulated. Media devices will automatically process data that overlays our lived experience 
with sensory simulations. Media become not so much a representation of the world, but an 
augmented lens on the world, customised to our preferences, mood, social status and location. 
A critical conceptual issue then for critical approaches to public interest communication is 
how to account for the presence and actions of media technologies as non-human actors in 
public culture.  
 
While there is an emerging and important debate about the role platforms’ algorithms and 
interfaces play as ‘brokers’ of symbolic expression (Clark et al. 2014; Crawford 2014; 
Hindman 2008), we should not frame this issue too narrowly. We need to consider what it 
means for the public interest when media institutions do not produce content, but instead are 
led by the effort to engineer a data-processing infrastructure that shapes everyday public life. 
The emerging investment of platforms in engineering projects like logistics, machine 
learning, artificial intelligence and virtual reality suggest that platforms are not creating more 
engaging forms of symbolic expression, but rather new kinds of media hardware and 
software. These investments ought to prompt us to reconsider what kinds of commercial and 
public institutions media companies are. If in the twentieth century we understood media as 
flows of symbolic expression distributed via mass institutions, as we move forward media 
appear to be morphing into data-processing infrastructure that intervene in, experiment with 
and organise everyday life to challenge historical notions of what might have once 
understand as public interest communication. 
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